

Rehabilitation, Recognition and Misrecognition

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INTRODUCTION

Even before I developed an academic interest in rehabilitation, I had a professional interest in these subjects. I worked in residential drug rehabilitation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and then as a "justice social worker" (or probation officer) for most of the rest of the 1990s. So, I have been charged with the responsibility of supporting the rehabilitation of people in both those contexts.

But it is also important to acknowledge that even before the development of that professional interest, I had a personal interest in rehabilitation, as I think we all do. Probably the first time that I thought about rehabilitation (even if I did not use the term then) would have been when as a child I first recognised that I had hurt someone; most likely one of my parents or siblings. Since the relationship in question mattered to me, something had to be done about that hurt if we were going to restore the relationship and continue to get along together in the family in which my life was rooted.

So, rehabilitation – meaning here the process by which social relationships are restored after harm – is something which matters to all of us, whether or not we are touched by substance use problems or by criminal justice entanglement. But let me turn now towards that criminal justice context.

PUNISHMENT AND VIOLENCE

Both punishment and rehabilitation exist to address a problem of violence. By "violence" here I mean any action which violates those relationships of reciprocity on which our social life together depends. When we cause harm to one another, whether criminalised or not, we do violence to the social relationships on which our capacity to flourish as human beings depends.

Slavoj Žižek (2008), the Slovenian philosopher and cultural theorist, in his book *Violence*, helps us to look beyond our immediate, everyday understandings of interpersonal violence involving physical action and injury; a form of violence which as he notes has a "fascinating lure". Indeed, we seem to be endlessly fascinated by violence; whether watching or reading "Nordic noir" (or indeed "Tartan noir") stories about serial killers on the loose; or watching and enjoying violence in the context of sport, where it is corralled and regimented within frameworks of rules which makes it seem more acceptable.

But Žižek insists that we must also look beyond or behind that form of violence, which he labels "subjective violence", to understand the systemic violence that lies behind and beneath interpersonal conflict and harm. Here, he is referring to three forms of violence. One

is the violence embedded in language. Essentially, symbolic violence attributes a certain kind of spoiled identity and with it a kind of cultural de-valuing such that particular people (and social groups) come to be degraded in some way or other: It diminishes them as people (and fellow citizens) through the language used to describe them, and its symbolic power also produces material consequences.

Secondly, influenced by Marxism of course, Žižek argues that violence is also inherent in the social arrangements of capitalism, principally in the inequalities that produce very significant harms for specific populations, especially (but not exclusively) those on the wrong end of social inequalities.

Thirdly, he reminds us that we should attend to social arrangements and institutions that are themselves sustained by threats of legitimated violence. Obviously, since this is a criminology conference, we will easily recognise that prisons (but also probation and policing) are such institutions; the power of the police, the power of the probation officer, the power of the courts, the power of the prison staff, is ultimately underwritten by the possibility of them deploying lawful violence to neutralise a threat, or to secure compliance from or apply punishment to a fellow citizen. We may hope that this threat is not often enacted, but it is nonetheless what underlies the system of criminal justice. We know this because if people fail to comply and keep on failing to comply with the instructions of police and penal authorities then, eventually, these agents of the state will – at the very least – lay their hands on those people and put them in places where they would not choose to be. In any other circumstances, this would be a criminal offence. It is not an offence in this context only because the violence is state-legitimated.

Žižek, then, points to the importance of symbolic, structural and systemic violence and encourages us to look beyond our obsession with interpersonal violence. In Figure 1, I use this framework to highlight three sets of relationships in which we might be interested as criminologists. We might look at subjective, interpersonal violence recognising that that is crime or a subcategory of crime. We might see that the way that we respond to crime in the criminal justice system sometimes entails and represents systemic and symbolic violence. Being subjected to punishment does not only mean that you are subject to potential violence from agents of the state. It also means that you are degraded. In the process of being punished your citizenship is in a certain sense diminished. Garfinkel (1956), of course, wrote famously about status degradation ceremonies, with court proceedings being one such example.

So, we have subjective violence, through criminalisation and penalisation, leading to systemic and symbolic violence. But we also have plenty of criminological evidence that punishment produces or reinforces structural inequalities. In the populations of our prison systems and, to a certain extent, in the populations on our probation caseloads we find the most disadvantaged people in any society; and their unequal position is reinforced through processes of punishment. So, we can construct this diagram as a vicious circle, a recurring problem; inequalities underpin and provoke subjective violence; we respond with legitimated state violence; that violence reinforces the inequality, which may motivate further offending, which leads to further punishment, and so on and so on.




Figure 1. Forms of Violence.

VIOLENCE AND REHABILITATION

More narrowly, we need to ask what is the relationship between these forms of violence and rehabilitation? In the common sense understanding of rehabilitation, particularly amongst people who are in favour of it and optimistic about it, rehabilitation can be seen as a means of violence reduction. Rehabilitation can aim to help a person change so that they do not conduct themselves violently in future. That is a very important and very common meaning of rehabilitation. But equally, rehabilitation is often cast as an alternative to punishment, or as a way of reducing the adverse effects of punishment, thus seeking also to reduce symbolic and systemic violence, not just subjective or interpersonal violence.

However, on the other side of the argument critics of rehabilitation would argue that rehabilitation is itself an expression or form of violence. C.S. Lewis, who is now most famous as the writer of children's fiction (the Narnia books) was also a very popular theologian and essayist and an English language

academic at the University of Oxford. He wrote a very interesting critique of reformist approaches to punishment, suggesting that: “[of] all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive” (Lewis, 1953, p. 228). The victims he has in mind here are “offenders”. What Lewis feared was that enthusiasm for supposedly scientific rehabilitation risked allowing crude mechanisms of psychological control to transform and change people who deserved both to be respected as autonomous individuals *and* to be punished. So-called scientific attempts to interfere with their character or personality were tyrannical in his assessment.

From a quite different perspective, Pat Carlen, a very distinguished English critical criminologist, in a paper entitled “Against rehabilitation: For reparative justice” argues:

...the ideal of rehabilitation is played out through different disciplinary, welfare and security rhetorics, and yet with always the

same effect: of malignantly returning poorer and already-disadvantaged law-breakers to their place at the same time as benignly keeping richer and more powerful criminals in theirs (Carlen, 2013, p. 90).

Certainly, I agree that the gravest of harms have been perpetuated not by the majority of people presently filling prisons; many of whom have little or nothing to be rehabilitated to. Indeed, this is a common complaint of critical criminologists: that all the "re"-words -- rehabilitation, reinsertion, reintegration, resocialisation -- peddle a myth that the people caught up in criminal justice were once habilitated, integrated, socialised and well-supported by a just and fair society against which they offended.

In an essay in the *British Journal of Criminology*, Zygmunt Bauman (2000) does not so much critique rehabilitation as declare it dead, because of the rise of a consumerist, postmodern, neoliberal society. Rehabilitation was once linked to a great collective project of social welfare and security associated with the rise of the post-war welfare states and with social democracy itself. But the late-modern demise of that project means that "[t]he question of 'rehabilitation' is today prominent less by its contentiousness than by its growing irrelevance" (Bauman, 2000, p. 210).

Yet, just a few years later, Francis Cullen, a very distinguished American criminologist, was advocating for:

a new pathway – one that draws on Americans' long-standing cultural belief in offender reformation and on the emergent "what works" scientific literature. We should reaffirm rehabilitation as corrections' guiding paradigm (Cullen, 2007, p. 728).

Choosing between these positions on rehabilitation and assessments of it is not straightforward, partly because the forms of violence in play are complicated and diverse, but also because the meanings of rehabilitation are complex and often unclear. We have a great word in the Scots dialect: "fankle". In English, its closest translation would be "tangle". But a fankle is more than a tangle; a person can be described as being "in a fankle" when they are in a state of confusion. I think rehabilitation is a fankled concept. We need to carefully disentangle its meanings and its different elements to try to understand what it is that we should oppose, and what it is that we should support.

I will come back to this de-fankling project later but let me end this introduction by clarifying the meaning of misrecognition, since this is the mirror that I want to hold up to rehabilitation in the remainder of this paper. Nancy Fraser, the American feminist and social theorist, suggests that if we want to pursue social justice, there are three Rs that we must attend to. One is the *redistribution* of material resources. Another is political *representation*, making sure that the voices of people are heard in decision-making that affect them. The third is *recognition*. Fraser argues that:

...people can also be prevented from interacting on terms of parity by institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value that deny them the requisite standing; in that case, they suffer from status inequality or misrecognition (Fraser, 2007, p. 20).

In other words, a person can be seriously disadvantaged where constructed norms and standards allow their voices and positions to be ignored or regarded as worthless while others are elevated and celebrated. Those denied the requisite standing suffer from status

inequality or "misrecognition". So, misrecognition denies status, maldistribution denies resources and misrepresentation denies voice. And in those conditions, there is no social justice.

With the scene set, in the next part of the paper, I will offer two contrasting examples of rehabilitation processes. One is, I think, a definitive example of *rehabilitation as misrecognition*. The second is an example of *rehabilitation as recognition*, so there may be something useful to learn from comparing the two. Comparing the two examples will, I hope, help us to assess the circumstances under which rehabilitation is violent and the circumstances under which it can support human flourishing and, perhaps, social justice.

Rehabilitation as Misrecognition: Teejay's story

Between 2012 and 2016 I was chair of the European Union-funded COST Action IS1106. This research network on offender supervision spanned 23 countries and had about 70 active members. We wanted to try to develop new methods and new concepts for studying penal supervision. One subgroup of the Action was interested in how people experienced such supervision. To that end, we tried to think of creative and innovative ways to explore those experiences, realising that interview-based research might be affected by selection and social desirability biases (Durnescu et al., 2013).

In our *Supervisible* project (Fitzgibbon et al., 2017), we tried a different approach. We used disposable or digital cameras to enable people who were or had been subject to supervision in Germany, England and Scotland to take pictures that represented what it felt like for them to be supervised. Then, in each country, we got the participants together, looked at the pictures and explored what they

communicated. Other colleagues ran a similar sister project called *Picturing Probation*, where we asked practitioners to take pictures that represented their work (Worrall et al., 2017). In a subsequent project called *Seen and Heard* we put a dozen of the photographs from these projects together and used them as stimulus materials in a songwriting workshop attended by people with experiences of supervision and (with the help of professional musicians) co-wrote songs that reflected further on these experiences.

In that songwriting workshop, I co-wrote a song called *Blankface* with a man called Teejay. He had also taken part in the Scottish fieldwork for the *Supervisible* project. Previously, I have written in detail both about Teejay's photography and about the songwriting process (McNeill, 2019). To summarise here, Teejay is a Glaswegian, working class man in his 50s. Long since released from the custodial part of a life sentence imposed in his youth, he is now serving life licence parole in the community. He will be on this kind of parole for the rest of his life unless he is recalled to custody. When I first met him (around 2014), his time in prison was already long distant: indeed, he had already spent more than 10 years under supervision in the community. We met a few times over the course of a couple of years and have stayed in touch since.

In the songwriting workshop, Teejay was drawn to four pictures that had been hung next to each other on a wall. One showed a Dutch probation officer across a desk in an interview room; she looks tired and is staring blankly past the camera. Another showed the sliding doors of a Dutch probation office. The third picture, taken by a German man subjected to post release supervision, showed an alarm clock at midnight: zero hours. The fourth was taken by a Scottish man subject to a community sentence. It shows the shadows cast by two men who have climbed onto a

children's climbing frame, with one higher than the other. Both look as if they are caught in a net or web.

Teejay recognised the blank-faced expression of the Dutch probation officer and suggested that, as her supervisee, he would have offered a blank face in return. He supposed that they would never connect, and that the supervision order would inevitably be breached so that he'd return to prison, through the sliding doors. Then, at zero hours, he'd be re-released and the cycle would repeat. Over the course of a couple of days, we worked together on a song that developed this narrative and set it to suitable music; a kind of "rising lament" as we called it.¹

I have reproduced the song's lyrics here:

*The clock spins, zero hour begins
This is the end, the end again
Here sits Blankface and she spins my tale
I've stopped listening now I know that I'll fail*

*Tick by tick and line by line
Thread by thread now you weave mine
A web of shadows, a silk spun tomb
A windowless room, windowless room*

*Sliding doors open and they welcome me
in
This is the place, the place we pay for sin
These four seasons they reflect in glass
Trapped in a jar here where the time will
not pass*

*Tick by tick and line by line
Thread by thread now you weave mine
A web of shadows, a silk spun tomb
A windowless room, windowless room*

*One day ending, a new day begins
Tick says "he'll do it", again and again and
again
You see what you want but I know it's not
real
Anyone out there who can feel what I feel?*

I play this song to my students from time to time and ask them what feelings it evokes. They tend to say things like hopelessness, despair, frustration, being trapped, being lost, being misunderstood.

Thinking about the song as a representation of (imagined) misrecognition, we might say that the Blankface is looking at Teejay but not seeing him; at least not as he sees himself. Instead, she is painting a picture or spinning a tale of him through the process of filling in the paperwork of the penal system; perhaps the risk assessment form: "Tick by tick and line by line". In the song, the metaphor switches to "thread by thread", referencing the spider's web, a "web of shadows"; and then a "windowless room", indicating no escape from this misrecognition. Indeed, Teejay said directly in reference to the fourth picture that the criminal justice system is like a spider's web. "The more you struggle, the more tightly bound you become". To me, that seems a very vivid description of the systemic violence of the criminal justice system. Indeed, right at the end of the song, there is a very strong and clear claim of misrecognition: "You see what you want but I know it's not real, anyone out there who can feel what I feel?"

In my 2019 paper, I used my encounters with Teejay to develop the idea of the "Malopticon"; a spin on Jeremy Bentham's "Panopticon" prison design, which, of course, Michel Foucault used to illustrate the nature of disciplinary power. But I argued, contra Foucault,

¹ The song can be accessed here: <https://www.voxlinis.co.uk/media/blankface/>

that Teejay wasn't describing disciplinary punishment at all. His rehabilitation was no longer in question. The social workers that he is supervised by are not making any effort to discipline or change him. Yet the justice system still manages him as if he were somehow risky; in that sense, it sees him badly. It also (still) sees him as "bad" and projects that misjudgement, cementing him in his social position as a permanently degraded and risky subject. That misjudgement has material consequences for the rest of his life, it curtails his liberties, affects his participation in the labour market and his standing in his community. In every aspect of his life, he will always be someone under supervision, someone who cannot be trusted to direct his own life.

Rehabilitation as Recognition: Mary and Grace

Next, let me move on to my more positive example, Mary, who told me that the whole trajectory of her life was transformed by the intervention of a probation officer called Grace (both names, like Teejay, are pseudonyms). Mary was 17 years old when she was placed on probation for a second offence in the mid-1960s. She came to see me at my office in 2009 in response to a newspaper advert that I had placed asking people who had been on probation in the 1960s in Scotland to talk to me about their experiences. The events that Mary related, then, were more than 40 years in the past.

In the early 1960s, Mary had managed to get into a good high school after her family had moved from an inner-city slum to a new peripheral housing estate in Glasgow. She was working hard at school and aimed to achieve qualifications to allow her to become a journalist and travel the world: that was her dream. But, at the age of 15, her parents told her she would have to leave school and get a job in a factory. They were poor and needed

the money. This was what provoked Mary's rebellion, expressed in the minor offending which led to probation supervision.

She found the experience of court intensely embarrassing and degrading. The judge berated her for being a disgrace to her school and her family. Her first probation officer was an older woman who was very authoritarian, who she didn't relate to or engage with, and who simply reinforced the shame and the parental instruction to get a job and settle down. But after about six months, Mary's case was transferred to Grace Carswell. Here's how Mary described what happened next:

Mary: And I had to go to there, oh I can't remember, two or three weeks' time or something like that. But she said the letter would be sent. So, the letter came and I went to the office and I met Grace Carswell and I can honestly say Grace Carswell turned my life around.

Fergus: *Okay.*

Mary: We hit it off straight away, you know, she was really, really fantastic. And instead of having to, coming into town to the probation office, I ended up going to see her in a school, in a primary school which was just down the road and she said I was to go once a week, she saw me once a week. And it was really good, you know, I was able to tell her about my home life, you know, and how miserable that I felt and she asked me what I wanted to do with my life and, you know, we just hit it off, we just hit it off. And on the occasions, you know, she'd say occasionally to come to the office in town and I would go... and she'd take me to tea in town, it was called Miss Cranstoun's. Now, you must remember here I was a 17-year-old, terrible background, you know, I never had any money and she would take me into this beautiful tea-room, you know, where all these well-dressed

people were sitting and, with the cake-stand, the waiter coming and, you know, I'd be sitting – I was absolutely overawed – overawed with it! And I thought "Gosh, she's brought me here!", you know, she's brought me here. So then -

Fergus: *Just a bit – what did that convey to you, that she'd brought you there? What did it mean to you?*

Mary: *I think it said that she liked me and, you know, and she listened to what I was saying and also sitting there and looking round as well and I thought "I could be here too, I could do this as well", you know – "This is what I want to do, this is what I want to do".*

Fergus: *Okay.*

Mary: *And then it got on we started talking about what, you know, well she did ask me what I wanted to do and I had said to her, you know, I had always wanted to be a journalist and I had always wanted to travel, you know, and I told her I never got the opportunity, she knew all that.*

Fergus: *Uh-hu.*

Mary: *And then we started talking about that, you know, I... left school at 15, absolutely nothing, absolutely nothing and no qualifications whatsoever. So, she said to me about nursing, she said "Do you ever think about nursing Mary?" and of course I just laughed at her and I thought "Gosh, no, no, no". And I said, "I wouldn't get into nursing, I don't have any qualifications". She was looking at it from the aspect because I wanted to travel and I think, when I look back, she was saying "Here is your opportunity to travel". I also think, as well she knew, and I knew, that I had to get out of the environment that I was living in, you know, I had to get out of there or else nothing would have worked. So, she encouraged me to write and I wrote to Heystoun*

hospital..., so I wrote there and got the interview and thought "Oh my God" and went for the interview and I was accepted. I was accepted... to do an enrolled nurse two-year course then and I was absolutely delighted. My mother was not happy at all; she said I would last six weeks at it and of course she had to go and [get] – I think they called it a Provident cheque² or something -- a ten-pound Provident cheque because I had to get shoes and the wee fob watch and things like that.

Fergus: *Yeah, yeah.*

Mary: *And so, I started at Heystoun hospital and I think as well the good thing about it too was you had to live in so I was away. I was away from home, I was away from all the fighting, I was away from all that and I just went on from there. I did my general, I did my specialism, worked with [indigenous peoples in different countries] –*

Fergus: *Wow!*

Mary: *-- and worked in [Asia] and –*

Fergus: *So you got to travel!*

Mary: *I got to travel and really I can only say it was due to Grace, it was due to her. She got married – you know, she used to tell me things, you know, wee things – still very professional but she would tell me wee things. She told me when she got engaged and things like that. She got married and then she got pregnant very quickly after she got married but at that time too it was coming up to the end of my probation as well and that was it. Really, I have never looked back.*

What happened then in this encounter that was so life transforming? I have written in more detail about Mary's story in a forthcoming

² For working class Glaswegians, "Provident cheques" were a common means of securing credit,

in return for weekly repayments collected from the home.

ing book chapter (McNeill, 2023, forthcoming) but in brief, Grace recognised Mary. First, she moved towards her in social terms. Rather than maintaining the status hierarchy between them and the social distance that the power of the probation officer conferred, she moved towards her. She did so by practising hospitality. Elsewhere in the interview, Mary described how Grace shook her by the hand and asked her if she wanted something to drink. Grace also listened attentively to Mary's story and her circumstances. She didn't lecture her as the judge, her parents and the first probation officer had done. Instead, she heard and validated Mary's story, not imposing a different story on her. Then in the visit to the tearoom, Grace showed Mary her worth and her potential, as opposed to cementing her in the social position that she was so desperate to escape. Together they set about co-authoring a new story for Mary, including by licensing Mary's silence about discrediting aspects of her past. The results were undeniably transformative in precisely the way that rehabilitation seeks.

DISCUSSION:

Comparing Teejay and Mary

Comparing these two stories, Teejay's is an account (or a creative representation) of misrecognition by a Blankfaced social worker; a pen-pushing apparatchik in a system which is inhumane and disinterested, and which is only concerned to sort a person into a category in order to treat (or mistreat) them in a specific way. What he communicated was the feeling of being stuck in an unequal position, a vulnerable position, a degraded position; one which entails immobility, irrespective of how much he might have changed as a person. He cannot go anywhere, he cannot do anything, he cannot move on. By contrast, Mary was recognised by Grace, and this means that, for her, forward movement is possible, not just through the probation order

but beyond it in her wider life trajectory. As Mary put it, Grace showed her "the places I could go".

The two stories also illustrate a distinction that Edgardo Rotman made many years ago, between two different kinds of rehabilitation:

The authoritarian model of rehabilitation is really only a subtler version of the old repressive model, seeking compliance by means of intimidation and coercion... The anthropocentric or humanistic model of rehabilitation, on the other hand, grants primacy to the actual human being rather than metaphysical fixations or ideologies, which long served to justify the oppressive intervention of the state. Client-centred and basically voluntary, such rehabilitation is conceived more as a right of the citizen than as a privilege of the state... (Rotman, 1994, p. 292).

Teejay's account is of authoritarian rehabilitation, whereas Mary explains the effects of being involved in rehabilitation realised in a much more anthropocentric form.

However, scholars analysing what contemporary rehabilitation has in fact become in late modernity (and particularly in the Anglosphere), have noticed a dark side to the revival of rehabilitation through a "what works" lens in recent decades:

Rehabilitation is now typically justified in utilitarian terms: that is, as a technology capable of producing crime reduction outcomes and thus also an effective instrument of risk management/public protection: a penal technology which principally benefits not offenders themselves, but ra-

ther the "public at large" – not least communities of actual and potential victims. (Robinson, 2008, p. 439).

This recasting of rehabilitation as a risk management device creates legitimacy problems, both in the eyes of those that are nominally being rehabilitated, like Teejay, who resist and reject being treated as objects on whom the State operates in the interest of others, and in the eyes of the wider public. And for that public too, rehabilitation loses its legitimacy if it cannot demonstrate effectiveness in reducing reoffending and protecting them. Even if that claim can be supported in general terms via claims about reoffending rates, it may not survive in the face of high-profile examples of failure to rehabilitate or to supervise, however exceptional those cases may be.

What then is rehabilitation's future if, despite Bauman's prognosis, it has one at all? Robinson (2008) suggests that it is possible to foresee a "devolved" future for rehabilitation, where civic responsibility for helping people who have offended towards reform and reintegration comes to the fore once again, as it did in probation's origins in many countries. She suggests that this might also involve connecting rehabilitation more thoughtfully and more practically with reparative or restorative justice. Here, Robinson makes the subtle point that restorative practices, to the extent that they leave victims and communities satisfied, have utility, even if they fail to reduce crime.

Partly to try to make the case for this kind of future, in my "de-fankling" project (McNeill, 2014; Kirkwood & McNeill, 2015; Burke et al., 2018), I have articulated and (sometimes writing with others) refined a model of four inter-connected and inter-dependent forms of rehabilitation. *Personal rehabilitation* involves work that helps the individual to

change themselves, to develop their capacities and abilities, to explore their attitudes and values. Arguably, this has been the dominant concern of Anglophone criminology and Anglophone penal systems, often in the even narrower form of "correctional rehabilitation", which tends to assume that the thing to be corrected is the offending individual. But even when personal change is necessary and even when it happens, if the person is not judicially restored as a citizen, then they can't participate in society on equal terms; a criminal record can be a millstone around the returning citizen's neck, denying them access to the labour market and blunting their potential contribution as a citizen and a taxpayer. The blockage here is not within the person; it is caused by laws that states have passed which inhibit and constrain reintegration and participation. So, *legal or judicial rehabilitation* is also important.

Moral rehabilitation speaks to questions of reparative justice and of restoration and reconciliation between citizens. Even if the state considers that criminal matters are settled by the sentences courts impose, if victims and communities feel that justice has not been served, then there is no reconciliation. And for many people who have offended, a meaningful return to their community cannot happen safely and well without attending to such informal reconciliation. This also links to the fourth form: *social rehabilitation*. This concerns acceptance by others and belonging in community with others, so that when a citizen returns with new capacities to live well and contribute, and with their legal status restored, and where inter-personal reconciliation has been explored, then the wider community opens its doors and says, "Okay, you're back" or perhaps even "Welcome home" (Urie et al., 2017).

This acceptance, this sense of belonging in and to the community is obviously connected

to recognition. Indeed, all four forms of rehabilitation imply related kinds of recognition. Personal rehabilitation entails and requires recognition of personal potential and development. Legal rehabilitation requires recognition of restored and equal citizenship. Moral rehabilitation requires recognition of moral worth, of apology and reparation, and of restored membership of a polity. Ultimately, to be socially rehabilitated the returning citizen needs recognition as a legitimate, accepted and valued member of a community. To make all of this happen, the state has to commit and redistribute resources, and its professionals will likely have an important role to play. But it is in civil society and amongst our fellow citizens that reintegration happens (or fails to happen).

Conclusion

To conclude and to return to the questions with which I started, my argument is that rehabilitation can indeed be a form of state-imposed symbolic violence, at least when it is monological in nature. When the state and its agents impose narratives of people on people, then rehabilitation does symbolic violence and as a result faces fundamental problems in terms of its legitimacy. Furthermore, if those imposed narratives produce social immobility, including by reifying risk, then people subject to this form of penal power are stuck in a degraded position. This has been Teejay's experience.

In contrast, where rehabilitation recognises the worth and value of those that it engages, then it may find legitimacy, particularly when its practices and processes are dialogical. The Greek terms that lie behind the word dialogue refer to a "flow of meaning" between people; one which involves listening and hearing before speaking. It is through recognition and dialogue that for-

ward movement can be imagined and enabled; such an approach respects people both as they are and for what they can become. Grace understood the importance of that. She practiced dialogical rehabilitation.

Ultimately, Mary's experience and Grace's example also teaches us, I think, that rehabilitation may be less about enabling return to a condition that never existed and more about "reintegrative momentum" (Du Bois-Pedain, 2017); about moving forward. It is about generating that momentum, which also requires reparation, redistribution, representation, and recognition, and therefore the cooperation of the state with civil society and with citizens. Without owning those commitments and actively involving those collaborators, rehabilitation may indeed lapse into being, at best, ineffective and, at worst, violent.

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